In this short essay I will analyze a rather short passage in the Republic which, taken out of its immediate context, plays an important part in understanding Plato’s idea about the relation between knowledge and belief, and indirectly between this world and the world of Forms.
The passage is 476d-480a in the Republic, book V. The context is that Plato tries to answer how feasible the already outlined ideal state is. The answer is the famous: “Unless communities have philosophers as kings... there can be no end to political troubles, my dear Glaucon, or even to human troubles in general”(473c-e). Philosopher means lover of knowledge (wisdom), so Plato is urged to define knowledge and, more particularly, how knowledge is distinct from what non-philosophers are left with, belief.
Outline of the section
Socrates and Glaucon agree on that there are two types of people: the first group are sight-lovers, who are not concerning themselves with anything but the variety of objects in this world. Indeed, Socrates even puts forth that “their minds are constitutionally incapable of seeing and devoting themselves to beauty itself.” (476b) [What “constitutionally incapable” is intended to mean is an interesting question by itself, as one can ask whether they are by birth incapable or by wrongful destruction their nature to such a degree that there is no way by, i.e., their constitution has in effect changed.] The second group are the truth-lovers, who can contemplate the Forms themselves, e.g., experience beauty per se. The love of the plurality of a Form in manifestation implies that the sight-lovers have as their object belief, whereas the philosophers contemplate the Forms and in so doing have knowledge as their object.
The main part of the argument is Plato’s attempt to distinguish knowledge from belief by introducing the theory of Forms.
u First we are presented with a line ranging from knowledge to ignorance;belief is situated halfway. Whether the line is a continuous progression or knowledge, belief, and ignorance are discrete points will be discussed below. Knowledge is defined as what is; belief as what is and is not; and ignorance as what is not.
v Then Plato correlates the objects of sight-lovers with belief and those of philosophers with knowledge. The reason is that the object of the sight-lover has a probability that it is or is not. The philosopher has object the Form and the Form only is, by definition. From the definitions in u, we get that the philosophers have knowledge, whereas sight-lovers have belief.
Given this concise outline, we will focus on the main concern in the passage: Plato’s undifferentiated notion of being
Interpretations of einai
If not on philosophical grounds, the very toughness of translating the Greek “is”, œsti, into English would justify several interpretations of this section. There have emerged three main interpretive strands due to this difficulty. We will examine each of them in order, and then try to conclude which one seems most suitable for us understanding Plato primarily, and only secondarily the problem itself.
Existential use
In Plato’s Republic, Cross and Woozley argues that when Plato defines knowledge as what is (to onti), “is”, onti, is used as “be”. That is, they argue that Plato says that knowledge is what exists, what has “beingness”, whereas ignorance does not exist at all. From this reading, we get that belief has as its object both what exists inbetween, i.e., was is “semi-real”. So knowledge is dependent upon the existence of the object. (cf Theaetetus 188c-)
This existential use is hard to sustain. It can be argued that it does not make sense to talk about degrees of existence. Assume that there is only one object of belief. Then, by definition from u, this object both exists and does not exist. Such an outcome is absurd! (cf Theaetetus 188a, 189a) However, this harsh criticism of Annas is rather easily amended by substituting degrees of existence with degrees of being. This is what Cross and Woozley in effect do when they argue that the object of knowledge is something real, whereas the object of belief is less real. It would be absurd to propose that the object of belief is unreal, as it would be nothing.
The argument for degrees of beingness can be further explored. View Plato as a realist with reality being non-physical, non-mental but intelligible (Forms). With the distinction in the Divided Line (509d-513e) we can divide doxa(belief) up into pistis (opinion) and eikasia(conjecture). Day-dreams and other thoughts which are triggered off by thoughts themselves belong to eikasia. In contrast, the objects we perceive, through the sense-organs, have a given-ness, a being not dependent upon us perceiving them; they belong to pistis. Moving up the Line, we get at more and more real objects; they possess a higher degree of being in virtue of being less and less conditioned. Complete being is the nature of the Forms; therefore, the more being an object possesses the more real it is. For example, mathematical terms being without temporal dimensions are more real than the particulars which we can count using mathematics. Why are the particulars less real? Plato’s main criterion for knowledge is that it is infallible; thus, the object of knowledge must be unchanging. The fewer dimensions of change an object is subject to, the less prone it is to change. So, particulars being conditioned by time, space, and cause are more in a state of flux, i.e., less real. This does not imply, as Annas suggests, that they do not exist. Without necessarily having to introduce the Theory of Forms in book V, Plato nevertheless implies them in the existential reading: the theory of knowledge here developed not only influences but provides the basis for book VI and VII. That is, Plato’s epistemology structures his metaphysics.
Veridical use
I.
According to the veridical reading, Plato distinguishes knowledge and belief not by their objects but by the degree of truth that the cognition entails. To allow knowledge and belief to be different faculties but still have the same objects, Crombie argues that the object of a faculty is an internal accusative. That is, two faculties can have the same object but still have different effects because “sight and only sight sees and nothing but sights, that smell and only smell smells smells and nothing but smells.”[i] This implies that it is not the objects of the faculties that are different but the mental state that apprehends the objects. Therefore, a mental state which is only F, unqualifiedly, that mental state is knowledge. In this interpretation, beliefs are somewhere in a continuum between the two extremes of ignorance, agnoia, and knowledge, episteme. (479d)
This interpretation is supported by Gail Fine when she argues that epi can be applied to contents (=internal accusatives) as well as objects. Fine says that knowledge always has content and content is always true; therefore, knowledge implies necessarily truth. Thus, knowledge is defined by the total truth implication of its contents.
II.
Knowledge needs a perfect account, i.e., an account in terms of Forms. Once this account is attained, there is a possibility of knowledge of particulars. That is, knowledge can only be attained at a formal, general, level but this does not necessarily imply that it cannot be applied to objects whose ontological status hinders them from being objects of knowledge. It seems to me that it is in this way that belief attains the possibility of truth. [but wouldn’t attain existence thereby]
From this, Crombie argues that it is the mental state, the cognitive state, that we bring to the perception of the object that determines the truth content. The ontological status of the object is not what is crucial, i.e., the degrees of existence à la Cross and Woozley. The important point is which faculty, dunameis, is acting -- that of knowledge or that of belief. [Both Crombie and Fine argue that even though belonging to different faculties, knowledge and belief works on the same objects.]
This also allows Fine to argue that restricted to the sensibles, as are the sightlovers, one can’t attain more than belief because knowledge needs and account in terms of Forms. But the content of this account need not be restricted to Forms.
The veridical reading lends good support to why Plato wanted to crown philosophers as heads of states. Their refusal to be right on average, i.e., inductively, and instead being right by their knowledge made them having “perfect knowledge” as opposed to “empirical knowledge”. Given Plato’s emphasis on the need to apply philosophy by living it, i.e. philosophical discourse is not enough, we can see that the philosophers practical knowledge did not preclude them from empirical knowledge. On the other hand, and most importantly, the non-philosophers are confined to belief only. This is what makes the philosopher rex superium.
Predicative use
I.
When Plato states that knowledge is infallible it excludes even the possibility of being wrong, i.e., being actually right is not strong enough a condition. The object of knowledge has to be potentially and actually unqualified. This happens only if F is fully F. Indirectly, this necessitates belief to be both F and not-F. If belief is only F, then it is an object of knowledge, as it is cannot turn out to be not-F. So for belief to exist as differentiated from knowledge, ignorance has to be implied. That is, ignorance has an existence by virtue of knowledge.
Annas is arguing for the predicative standpoint when she says that belief carries opposite predicates, sharing both F and not-F. This is a necessity with the sensibles, as they are not unambiguous; e.g., we say “real” friend, to qualify the object. Vlastos defines Plato’s object of knowledge as being “cognitively dependable, undeceiving.”[ii] The sightlovers are not mistaken about the existence of the sensible objects, but of their degree of reality. The fallibility of the sense-particulars is due to them being conditioned by space, time, or cause (relation). The Forms, on the other hand, are more real as they are not in any way conditioned but unqualifiedly, unconditionally is. Taking that the objects of knowledge as infallible one arrives at qualifications which are most descriptive of the Forms. Therefore, defining knowledge as the upper limit of a progression from cognitively false to cognitively reliable, the Forms become the objects of knowledge. This justifies Vlastos saying “Thus the degrees-of-reality doctrine is, in this respect, a lucid consequence of Plato’s epistemology.”[iii]
Practical example: When in love, you don’t doubt that you are in love. Still the other person can question your love for him/her as long as it is not unconditional love for that person. More formally, “real” love is love which is personified in the one person but not personalized to him/her; if it were personalized, it would be conditional upon that person and thus not be unconditional. Therefore, it is not “real” love before you can say “yes” to “Liebst du um Liebe, o ja -- mich liebe. Liebe mich immer, dich lieb ich immerdar.”[iv]
II.
In contrast to the veridical reading, Annas arrives at a two world theory as knowledge and belief being different faculties, they cannot have same objects: I know only F if F is always and fully F.
This same dichotomy between the objects of knowledge and belief is found in Vlastos. Arguing, in effect, against Fine’s standpoint, Vlastos is implying a monist view of perception, “If we want this sort of knowledge [empirical knowledge], its only possible subject-matter would consists of those very things we observe by the senses.” In the same passage, he on goes saying “that Forms are “real” as judged by the criteria of the kind of knowledge which aspires to logical certainty, while only sensibles are “real” as judged by the very different criteria of empirically testable knowledge.”[v] In other words, Vlastos does not see any way for knowledge proper to be applied to this world. Using the phrase “empirical knowledge” merely enhances the value -state of belief, doxa. Thus, Vlastos puts forth the idea that instead of going with a degrees-of -reality-theory, Plato just needs a kinds-of-reality theory, characterized by logical vs. empirical knowledge.
Conclusion
There is a crucial problem inherent in the arguments around the different meanings of einai. This problem is that looking for the tree we might miss the forest. Specifically, it is too unclear from this section what Plato himself means with knowledge being epi to onti. What is needed is an understanding of Plato’s aim with book V and the Republic, in general. This is, of course, beyond the scope of this essay! An alternative route, and a definite shortcut, would be to argue with Hadot that Plato tried more to form than inform us:
“...it is not concerned with the exposition of a doctrine, but with guiding an interlocutor to a certain settled mental attitude: it is a combat, amicable but real... it is necessary to make oneself change one’s point of view, set of convictions.”[vi]
Apart from all three readings being commendable, I think that the existential reading is my preferred interpretation. One reason is that I think that epistemological conclusions informed Plato’s metaphysics (notice how the Theaetetus deals with epistemology without metaphysics), a development which the existential reading quit readily admits. The main reason, however, is not that the veridical use or the predicative use do not fit the section; they fit logically very well. Rather, I prefer the existential reading because it appears to me more Platonic, more akin to what Plato himself would have delivered.
Bibliography
Annas, J. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic Oxford: OUP, 1981.
Crombie, I. M. An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967.
Cross, R. C. and Woozley, A. D. Plato’s Republic London: Macmillan, 1964.
Fine, G. “Knowledge and Belief in Republic V” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (60), 1978.
Hadot, P Philosophy as a Way of Life Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
Plato The Republic (trans. Robin Waterfield) Oxford: OUP, 1993.
Vlastos, G. “Degrees of Reality in Plato” in R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
White, N. Plato on Knowledge and Reality Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976.
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