Introduction
The second part of Theaetetus deals with the question of falsehood. After having discarded the first notion of Theaetetus, that the object of knowledge is sensation, Theaetetus tries again by arguing that knowledge is true judgement. As will be seen, Theaetetus’s second assertion allows Plato to bring ina careful study of the possibility of false judgment.
1. Strategy
1.1. Problem:
This part is opened with the argument “from knowing and not knowing”: all judgments must be true. Simply put, making a judgment presupposes one has knowledge of the object being judged; having this knowledge, how can one then make a mistake about it? This leads Theaetetus to conclude that false judgements are not possible. Also, all judgments must be true as false judgment is judging something which is not, and judging something which does not exist, amounts to no judging at all. Therefore, the only possible judgment is true judgment, that is judging what is.
The question of mind’s relation to its objects is, obviously, the main issue. Like Denyer does, it will be helpful to list what kinds of knowledge are brought up here as bridge between subject and object:
1. knowledge by acquaintance / description
2. mediated / immediate knowledge
3. partial / full knowledge
The first is suggested by Russell, where knowledge by description is less fallible than knowledge by acquaintance because of analysis and reflection. Plato deals with this problem in
Plato touches upon the question of whether only immediate knowledge counts for knowledge, or if knowledge by account is possible. This is mainly dealt with at the end of part II, in the analogy of the jury.
Thirdly, is full knowledge required to make a judgment, let alone a true judgment? This will be discussed within the framework of the aviary, and by comparison, the wax-block.
1.2 Solution:
As response to the claim that only true judgment is possible, we have three suggested solutions. First, Socrates argues that “other-thinking”, thinking about one thing when only another is correct, accounts for false judgment. As a second proposal, Socrates puts forward the Wax Tablet: We have imprints of previous perceptions, and when perceiving we try to fit the new impression into the old marks. This allows for misfitting, that is misidentification of the object, and results in false judgment. The third account is the Aviary where the birds flying around are symbolizing pieces of knowledge and, also, pieces of ignorance. In contrast to the Wax Tablet which deals with falsehood in relation to sense-perception, the Aviary deals with false judgment in thinking. It makes falsehood possible by contrasting active and passive knowledge.
To investigate the proposed strategy of Plato, we will first account and analyze true judgment and then try to see whether false judgment is made possible through any of the three solutions.
2. True judgment
Having defeated the notion of knowledge is perception, Socrates clarifies Theaetetus’s new notion thus: “There are two forms of judgement, true and false; and your definition is that true judgement is knowledge?” (187c). There are to separate accounts that both concludes that only true judgment is possible. First, we have the argument “from knowing and not knowing” and second, “from being and not being”.
2.1 Argument “from knowing and not knowing”
Socrates comes up with what is argued to be an exhaustive list of possibilities of judging falsely:
- something you know is something else you know (KX=KY)
- something you do not know is something else you do not know (UX=UY)
- something you know is something which you do not now (KX=UY)
- something you do not know is something you know (UX=KY)
where K is known, U is unknown, and {X,Y} are distinct members of the set of possible objects.
Furthermore, by ascertaining i) that we either know or do not know a thing, and that this is true for all things; and ii) that the objects of judgement are things which he knows or does not; and iii) knowledge precludes ignorance, Socrates argues that judging falsely is impossible. (188ab)
ii) is modified to that objects must be of things one knows: “Is it possible that a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should take it into his head that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?” (188b). Given this more stringent qualification (iib), that judgments must be of objects one knows, false judgments are made impossible because knowing something precludes one from mistaking it, misidentify, for something else where “something else” must be unknown as the known objects are already excluded from misidentification. However, the unknown can by iib) not even enter”into his head”. Therefore, only true judgments can exist.
Even though Socrates says that 1-4 is an exhaustive list of possible false judgments, misidentifications, we immediately note that, for example, negative falsehoods and misdescriptions are excluded. As pointed out by Burnyeat, the inclusion of misdescriptions makes the identity-statements less powerful as the two members in the identity being two distinct and exclusive objects do not make it a false identity once misdescriptions are introduced. For example, “I am you” is an example of misidentification and, consequently, false judgment. Saying that “I am capable”, is a case of misdescription, perhaps; it does not by its very structure reveal whether it is true or false, though.
Is it by weakness of argument that Plato leaves out misdescriptions? Fine argues that they can be inferred here, given their inclusion in the “other-judging”-account later on. Misdescriptions imply misidentification: judging me competent when incompetent presupposes a misidentification of incompetence for competence. Burnyeat suggests that Plato is here really concerned with false identity-judgments and, therefore, does not include them.
2.2 Argument “from being and not being”
Even though Socrates seems content with having concluded that false judgments are not possible, he suggests to Theaetetus that they try another route, “by way of being and not being”: “Can a man judge what is not, either about one of the things which are, or just by itself?” (188cd). There is a crucial distinction here between a)judging what is not about one of the objects and b)judging what is not by itself. The latter implies that what is wrongly judged does simply not exist. On the other hand, the former says that we are judging something but so, wrongly applied.
When judging, one judges something which is. If judging something which is not, one does not judge. Judging nothing, one does not judge at all.(189ab) Coupling this progression with the initial definition: “it is when a man judges about anything things which are not, that he is inevitably judging falsely”(188d), we get that the object of false judgment is “nothing”. This absurd result seems to stem from Socrates’s confusion between a and b. The object of the false judgment exists but the content of the false judgment does not apply; it is wrongly described. Socrates did not see this distinction between what Burnyeat describes as “what a judgement is about and what is judged about it.”[i] The upshot is, thus, that false judgments are about objects which are. As a response to this conclusion, Socrates offers the “other-judging account”.
3. Heterodoxy
As a first attempt to save the possibility of falsehood, Socrates puts forward the idea of “other-judging”, heterodoxia. False judgment is possible if when thinking about something which exists, one substitutes, in thought, this one thing for something else, which also exists. In other words, he “missed the thing which was the object of his consideration,” (189c).
It seems as Socrates, having confused the above-mentioned distinction between a and b, rectifies the mistake by putting forward the heterodoxy-account. There is, however, more to this account than to a: in a, we assumed a misdescription; here, on contrary, misdescription is implied by the account assumming a misidentification. In “other-judging”, one actuallly exchange one thought for another.
Having stated the idea behind “other-judging”, Socrates tries to debunk it. By equating a statement addressed to oneself and judgment, Socrates can once again apply the already used argument of saying that having two things in front of you, both of which you know, it is impossible to judge the one for the other. Here, judging the one for the other amounts to saying that “A cow must be a horse”. Having both in one’s mind, one cannot mistake cow for horse; neither is it possible to mistake one for the other if only one is present to one’s mind. Therefore, Socrates concludes that the heterodoxy-account offers no help in explaining the existence of false judgment.
The reason for not criticizing Socrates’ easiness in discarding other-judging as allowing for false judgment by saying that it is ridiculous to mistake odd for even, would be that this account is not meant to be sophisticated but rather suggestive. If, however, one would like to analyze it, one finds that it is not that common-sensical doing away with the possibility of taking ugly for beauty. Assuming that there are more than one way that one’s thought can refer to a single object, it is far from implausible that one exchanges a cow for horse. Denyer puts the argument like this: distinguish between people’s truistic beliefs and your own cooments. Thus, in “A horse is a horse” the first mentioning of “a horse” refers to your mind’s comments, saying, of what is, by the second “a horse”, a truistic belief of other minds, and as such accepted as a standard. Moreover, the above-mentioned, “A cow must be a horse”, is not that straightforward anymore: even if one thinks that a specific cow is a horse, it is not implied that one thinks that “Cow is horse”. Does being wrong in a particular instance indicate that one has a general wrong conception. Furthermore, is one completely wrong by describing one cow as horse if not the whole truth about the specific cow is that it is a cow; using Plato’s account of particulars and universals, I would argue that one is not misidentifying the cow by calling it horse, but is definitively describing it incorrectly (misdescription).
Above all, it is Frege that we find the semantic basis for this problem: there is a crucial difference between Sinn(sense) and Bedeutung(meaning). The sense of an expression is its content of knowledge and considered as such objective. The relation between expression and meaning shows the extra-linguistic reality in a sentence. Thus, sense refers to the very object you think of as opposed to what you consider it as. The extra-linguistic reality allows X to not to be thought of as X, as a qualification by Bedeutung is allowed.
4. The Wax Tablet
After the heterodoxy account has refuted the possibility of false judgement, Socrates suggests that they have to find a way out; otherwise, they will be will be like seasick passengers who cannot do anything but let the boat steer its own way forth. As a new attempt to get in control of the argument, Socrates says that misidentification is possible in case 3 (KX=UY), i.e., one can make a judgment about an object you do not know. This forms the basis for the Wax Block analogy.
View the mind as a wax block. The wax is the memory-function of the mind, i.e., it retains perceptions by letting them make a stamp on it. “Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so long as the image remains in the wax.”(191d) Secondly, when perceiving again, we fit the new impression with one of the existing stamps. Whereas Socrates elaborates on the different qualities of wax corresponding to different abilities to remember, there is no mentioning of the difference which distinguishes the way of perceiving which lets the perceptions actually make a stamp on the wax, and the other perceptions which are just fitted to the already existing stamps.
Sometimes the wrong stamp is fitted to the perception, and false judgment results. Socrates describes this as seeing two objects at a distance and “applying the visual perception of the one to the sign of the other.” (193c) Given two known objects, {X, Y}, and letting r stand for right coupling and w for wrong coupling, we have the following possible sets: XrX, YrY, XwY, YwX. The two last constitute false judgment. They are caused by wrong consistency of the wax, i.e., the stamp has been blurred and thereby less clear which causes the stamp to be wrongly paired. By allowing for two distinct epistemic ways to mind, false judged is made possible. The same thing can enter mind either by perception directly or by a stamp being fit to the current perception; thus same object can be judged different without it being an apparent false identity.[ii]
Having concluded that false and true judgments exist and that false judgment arises in connecting perception with mind (195bc), Socrates admits that this excludes false judgment due to thought mistakes. In fact, Socrates discards the Wax Block model because it is confined to explain false judgment due to perception and thought, not just thought. For example, counting the numbers 5 and 7 as number 11 does not have anything with perception to do but is a pure thought mistake. Having both known numbers before oneself, in mind, it is impossible to judge wrongly. “it would mean that the same man must, at one and the same time, both know and not know the same objects.” (196c). Just to find an all-encompassing answer to what false judgment is, the Wax Block model is given up and Socrates moves on to ask if a man can both know and not know the same object.
In the Wax Block analogy, perception is directly presented to the mind; there is no intermediary thought-process (cf. end of part 1). How is it then possible to distinguish one thing for another? Must we not assume some kind of judgmental activity before the impression reaches the mind as a presentation?
5. The Aviary
Are the birds propositions such that 7+5=12 or terms like 12. Crombie argue that birds are “terms thought of as identical with the true propositions in which they figure.” p119
6. Conclusion
In analyzing a dialogue like the Theaetetus, I have adopted a slightly schizophrenic approach. On the one hand, the way forward is by relentless questioning, a lernen built on the pre-requisite “repititio est mater studiorum”. On the other hand, I am very often struck by Plato’s power to deliver clear intuitions. Analyzing these intuitions shows a genius in giving birth to them but less so in delivering a complex and coherent system of thought, which lends itself to scrutiny. Getting the intuition is not the same as working out the structure which it hints at. In this way, the two ways of knowledge in the analogy of the Jury comes together: you have to be there, to get direct knowledge; nevertheless, that is not enough as you have to also work through what you did perceive (cf 186c). In this sense, direct knowledge is only potential knowledge; it is unqualified. Therefore, the sense-perceptions are sometimes linked to the wrong stamp in the wax-block, as that model only accounts for non-mediated knowledge, perception unaided by thought. Likewise, the Aviary shows us that it is not enough to have knowledge as a kind of repetition; we must have made it our own, if possessing it is to exclude us from making false judgments. As concisely pointed out in the subtitle to Hadot’s book on Plotinus[iii], the vision‑immediate knowledge‑is not simple, but by grasping the whole of the structure, getting at the supra-structure, knowledge presents itself as the simplicity of vision.
Using the Theatetus, leads me to think that careful analysis is not only useful but necessary in order for us to progress to the understanding which was to Plato vision. Therefore, the dialogue shows how one is to relate to perception and thinking in order to get at knowledge.
[ii] In the Vedantic acosmism of Shankara we find the famous snake-rope analogy. The upshot is that the false has an existence by virtue of the real. Thus, he agrees with the Wax Block model which only allows for false judgment if both things we perceive are also known. This is in direct contradiction to case b in section 2.2. Crombie argues for case b when explaining agnoia, likewise Denyer puts forward the same point in saying “if one fails in the attempt to make a true judgment, one does not succeed even in making a false one instead.” Arguing against b, Shankara offers us a very similar analogy to 191b, where the main difference from case b and Crombie/Denyer is not the presentation but the interpretation. The following quote from Bhattacharyya illumines the existence of the false:
“The snake is first presented, it is next corrected, and then it is contemplated as corrected. It is in the first place presented and believed as real, though it is not affirmed or judged as real, its reality being ony not denied... The relation, it may be noted, is unique: the unreal implies the real but the real does not imly nor is it in any way affected by the unreal. The rope is a complete content which does not require to reject the content ‘snake’ and is neither the better nor the worse for having rejected. The snake, however, in the context is there as rejected or corrected by the other content, as illusory in its presence. The real has the unreal here as its free implication.”[ii]
[iii] Hadot, Pierre Plotinus, or the Simplicity of Vision. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1993.
No comments:
Post a Comment